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The spread of opinions, memes, diseases, and “alternative facts” in a population depends both on
the details of the spreading process and on the structure of the social and communication networks on
which they spread. One feature that can change spreading dynamics substantially is heterogeneous
behavior among different types of individuals in a social network. In this paper, we explore how anti-
establishment nodes (e.g., hipsters) influence the spreading dynamics of two competing products.
We consider a model in which spreading follows a deterministic rule for updating node states (which
describe which product has been adopted) in which an adjustable fraction pHip of the nodes in a
network are hipsters, who choose to adopt the product that they believe is the less popular of the
two. The remaining nodes are conformists, who choose which product to adopt by considering which
products their immediate neighbors have adopted. We simulate our model on both synthetic and real
networks, and we show that the hipsters have a major effect on the final fraction of people who adopt
each product: even when only one of the two products exists at the beginning of the simulations, a
very small fraction of hipsters in a network can still cause the other product to eventually become
the more popular one. To account for this behavior, we construct an approximation for the steady-
state adoption fraction on k-regular trees in the limit of few hipsters. Additionally, our simulations
demonstrate that a time delay τ in the knowledge of the product distribution in a population, as
compared to immediate knowledge of product adoption among nearest neighbors, can have a large
effect on the final distribution of product adoptions. Using a local-tree approximation, we derive an
analytical estimate of the spreading of products and obtain good agreement if a sufficiently small
fraction of the population consists of hipsters. In all networks, we find that either of the two products
can become the more popular one at steady state, depending on the fraction of hipsters in the
network and on the amount of delay in the knowledge of the product distribution. Our simple model
and analysis may help shed light on the road to success for anti-establishment choices in elections, as
such success — and qualitative differences in final outcomes between competing products, political
candidates, and so on — can arise rather generically in our model from a small number of anti-
establishment individuals and ordinary processes of social influence on normal individuals.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of spreading phenomena on networks has
received considerable attention in many disciplines, in-
cluding sociology, economics, physics, biology, computer
science, mathematics, and others [1–18]. In analogy with
the spread of infectious diseases in populations of suscep-
tible individuals, the spread of social phenomena (such as
opinions, actions, memes, information, misinformation,
and alternative facts) is often viewed as a contagion pro-
cess that spreads through a network’s nodes, which are
connected to each other via one or more types of edges.
The nodes can represent entities such as people or in-
stitutions [19–21] (or other things); and the edges can
represent physical proximity, communication channels,
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sociological interactions (e.g., different types of relation-
ships), or something else. An important goal of many
studies of the spread of social contagions is the identifi-
cation of criteria that determine when the phenomenon
that is spreading reaches a large fraction of a population
or subpopulation [1, 2].
Scholars have used various approaches for studying
contagions on networks. These include game theory [22],
statistical physics[10], agent-based models [23], and sys-
tems of coupled differential equations or stochastic pro-
cesses [2, 24–28]. The temporal dynamics and peak size of
an outbreak are influenced both by the specific model of a
contagion and by the structure of the network on which it
spreads [12, 20, 26, 28–35]. One of the focal ideas is to ex-
amine when a disease or idea, initially carried by a small
fraction of nodes, can become widespread in a network.
When a large fraction of a population or subpopulation
becomes infected (or adopts an idea), one says that a cas-
cade has occurred, and cascading phenomena have been
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2studied in a wide variety of systems, ranging from finan-
cial networks [21] to social media like Twitter [36]. For
example, a failing financial institution can cause a cas-
cade of failures of numerous other financial institutions, a
tweet can result in a cascade of tweets that promotes the
opinion of the original tweeter (perhaps influenced by the
actions of ‘bot’ or sockpuppet accounts [17]), and widely-
spread alternative facts can influence the opinions of a
large population of voters [37]. Notwithstanding these
dystopian examples, cascading behavior can beneficial,
neutral, or harmful.
Models of cascading behavior on networks can have
either stochastic or deterministic state-update rules, and
the update rules in most models only consider nodes that
are adjacent to the node under consideration. One can of
models that traditionally have deterministic update rules
are threshold models for social contagions. The simplest
example is the Watts threshold model (WTM) [5, 6, 9], a
type of bootstrap percolation [38], in which each node is
assigned a threshold from some distribution. When con-
sidering a node for updating, if the fraction of its neigh-
bors that are adopters is at least as large as its thresh-
old, it becomes an adopter itself. There are numerous
variants and generalizations of the WTM, including ones
with adoption thresholds that are based on the number
(rather than the fraction) of adopted neighbors [12, 39],
ones with multiple adoption stages [26], ones with “syn-
ergy” from other nearby adopters [28], and ones with
timers in addition to adoption thresholds [40].
Efforts to develop mathematical models for the spread
of products or innovations date at least as far back as
the 1960s. Rogers [41] described qualitatively (as a sig-
moidal shape) how the number of adopters should look
as a function of time. Bass [42] developed a model for the
adoption of innovations that was inspired by models for
biological contagions. Bass’s model results in sigmoidal-
shaped adoption curves, and it has been generalized in
various ways [43–46]. More recent studies have consid-
ered models in which agents of different types can have
significant effects on the final distributions of products
or innovations in a population. For example, [47] showed
that temporal cycles of adoption can occur if some nodes
are allowed to regret adopting an innovation while other
(“contrarian”) nodes resist adopting innovations. Ref-
erences [48, 49] found rich behavior (including chaotic
dynamics) in a social contagion model that incorporates
an aversion to complete conformity.
Contrarian agents, a key aspect of the present paper,
have been incorporated into various types of models of
opinion dynamics and hierarchy formation. In the 1980s,
Galam [50] illustrated a hierarchical mechanism that al-
lows a minority community to elect its preferred candi-
date instead of that of the majority. Galam and col-
laborators have also examined the effects of contrarian
[51] and stubborn [52, 53] agents on opinion dynamics
(though typically without any network structure). Ny-
czka et al. [54], Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron [55] studied
various opinion models (e.g., q-voter models) on a com-
plete graph to highlight an important distinction between
two types of nonconformity — anti-conformity and in-
dependence — that have distinct implications for social
dynamics. Khalil and Toral [56] incorporated contrari-
ans into a noisy voter model, and they illustrated that a
few contrarians can substantially alter the dynamics of
the model. Apriasz et al. [57] examined an opinion model
that includes “snobs”, who conform to nodes in their own
community but anti-conform to nodes in others, to exam-
ine how the density of connections between two commu-
nities can effect phenomena such as fashion cycles. One
can also consider contrarian individuals in the context
of economic markets, such as in work by Sznajd-Weron
and Weron [58], who studied an Ising model on a rect-
angular lattice to model advertising in duopoly markets.
More recent work related to contrarian agents, in addi-
tion to [47–49], includes that of Mellor et al. [59], who
examined a population in which nodes can either adopt
a product or become “luddites”, who oppose the spread
of innovation. They found that luddites greatly limit
adoption if the adoption rate is high but not if it is low.
Gambaro and Crokidakis [60] illustrated that contrarian
agents can be a source of disorder in opinion dynamics,
and Ferrara and collaborators have investigated how indi-
vidual social-media accounts controlled by bots can exert
a considerable influence on political elections and social
cascades [17, 61, 62].
Anti-conformity can manifest in a variety of ways in
society. For example, it has been reported in the soci-
ological literature that partisan bias can result in some
groups of individuals misinterpreting data and explana-
tions of experts (e.g., with respect to the issue of climate
change), in conflict with the intended message, such that
it fits with the personal beliefs of the group [63, 64]. In
a recent example about information spreading, Petersen
et al. [65] provided psychological assessment of motiva-
tions to share hostile political rumors (e.g., in the form
of “fake news”) among citizens of democratic societies,
concluding that such rumors are often shared by indi-
viduals because they believe it can mobilize their audi-
ence against a disliked establishment (rather than be-
cause they think that these rumors are true).
In the present paper, we examine the influence of anti-
establishment nodes, such as hipsters, on spreading pro-
cesses in a social network. Individuals who specifically
prefer something other than the established standard in
society have manifested in several ways over the last
decade. They include members of anti-establishment
movements in Western Europe and the United States
of America, who have hugely impacted the geopoliti-
cal landscape, to the curious style of hipsters in cities
throughout the world. In some cases, such as the 2016
“Brexit” vote [66] and the 2016 American presidential
election [67], anti-establishment opinions appear to have
spread to so many people that they exerted a major in-
fluence on political outcomes. In this paper, we ask the
following questions: (1) How does a large fraction of a
population decide to choose something different from the
3established standard? (2) How can a small fraction of
individuals spread their anti-establishment opinions to a
majority (or at least to a very large minority) of the rest
of a population? (3) Can we capture these ideas using a
simple mathematical model of a spreading process on a
network?
A few years ago, a statistical-physics approach was
used to examine how anti-conformists (i.e., hipsters) who
make decisions against the majority, thereby attempting
to stand out from the crowd, may all end up “looking the
same” [68] (wearing the same clothes, buying the same
products, having the same opinions, and so on). This
study observed that the dynamics of a population was
influenced greatly by delays in the knowledge of hipsters
and by how large a fraction of the population are hip-
sters. In the model in [68], individuals interact with their
environments and switch between two states {−si, si}
with a probability that depends on this environment and
on whether an individual is conformist (preferring to be
aligned with the environment) or a hipster (preferring to
be opposite to its environment). The model has a phase
transition, which determines whether or not hipsters ul-
timately attain the same state. Touboul [68] referred
to the anti-conformists with delayed knowledge as “hip-
sters”; because the model that we introduce in this study
includes anti-conformists with delayed knowledge of the
global product distribution, we also adopt this terminol-
ogy. Word choice notwithstanding, our approach, focus,
and type of model — which builds on threshold models
for social contagions — are rather different from those in
[68].
We will explore how anti-conformists (i.e., hipsters)
affect the spreading of competing products in a network
by generalizing the WTM to a network with two types of
nodes — hipsters and conformists — who respond differ-
ently to adoptions. Conformists prefer to adopt products
(or memes, opinions, messages, etc.) that the majority
of their neighbors have adopted at time t − 1. Hipsters,
however, prefer to adopt the product that is the less pop-
ular of the two products at some previous time t − τ .
Their choice to adopt a product uses the same adop-
tion condition as with the conformists. This is a strong
assumption, and we make it partly for simplicity (as it
allows us to build from the WTM) and partly because it
reflects a scenario in which an anti-conformist may more
actively rebel on an issue that is sufficiently established
in its neighborhood in a network. In our model, both
conformists and hipsters first choose to buy some prod-
uct or form an opinion, and then they choose which one
to adopt. In their study of the effect of luddites, Mellor
et al. [59] assumed that the probability of a node becom-
ing a luddite is proportional to the rate of change in the
density of adopters of its neighbors. This resembles our
choice that a node’s neighborhood influences whether or
not it chooses to adopt a product, bit it differs from the
fact that our nodes are either inherently a conformist or
inherently a hipster. The delay τ in our model encodes
the fact that knowledge about the total population is not
instantly available; instead, it is collected over some time
before it is available. See Gleeson et al. [69] for a model,
without network structure, that illustrates another type
of competition between local information (in the form of
a social-media feed) and global information (in the form
of a best-seller list).
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we introduce our model for spreading on net-
works under the influence of hipster nodes. In Section
III, we examine our model on a Facebook network. In
Section IV, we develop an analytical approximation to
describe the time-dependent fraction of nodes who adopt
the products as a function of their degree k and an adop-
tion threshold φ. In Section V, we examine our model on
several classes of empirical networks and investigate the
final fractions of nodes who adopt the two products as
a function of the time delay τ and hipster fraction pHip.
In Section VI, we explain the observed behavior in the
limit of few hipsters, and we obtain an approximation for
the fraction of nodes who adopt the different products as
a function of the number of hipsters. We conclude and
discuss our results in Section VII.
II. A THRESHOLD MODEL WITH HIPSTERS
A popular type of model for spreading processes on
networks are threshold models of social influence[1, 2, 6].
To set up a simple example of a threshold model, con-
sider a network with N nodes, and suppose that each
node i has an independently-assigned threshold φi that
we draw from a distribution f(φ). We also suppose that
a node can be in one of two states: active or inactive.
An active node has adopted a product (or meme, opin-
ion, etc.) that is spreading through a population, and an
inactive node has not adopted the product. (We will use
the term “product” from now on.) Once a node becomes
active, it stays active forever. The threshold of a node
determines how difficult it is to activate that node, so one
can construe a node’s threshold value as its stubbornness
level. Node i becomes active if a peer pressure, which in
the WTM is equal to the fraction of active nodes among
i’s neighbors, is greater than or equal to its threshold φi.
We seek to develop a model for competing products
that spread in a population that includes hipsters. There-
fore, in our model, each node i has a value Hi ∈ {0, 1},
such that Hi = 0 indicates that node i is a conformist
and Hi = 1 indicates that node i is a hipster. We update
nodes synchronously. At each discrete time t ≥ 1, we as-
sume that conformists know the distribution of products
among their immediate neighbors at the previous time
step t′ = t− 1, whereas hipsters know the distribution of
products in the total population at an earlier time step
tτ = t− τ (where τ ∈ N). The first updating step occurs
at t = 1. If t− τ < 0, we let tτ = 0.
A node chooses to adopt a specific product in two steps.
First, the node must become active, as determined by
whether sufficiently many of its neighbors are active. If
4the fraction of neighbors that are active at time t − 1
is at least as large as the node’s threshold, it becomes
active at time t. If node i becomes active, it immediately
adopts one of two possible products. If Hi = 0, node i
is a conformist and thus adopts the product that most
of its active neighbors have adopted at time step t −
1. However, if Hi = 1, node i is a hipster and thus
adopts the product that is the less popular in the total
population at time tτ = t − τ . For both Hi values, a
tie results in the node choosing one of the two products
with equal probability. Each node can adopt only a single
product; and once it has adopted a product, it never
switches to the other product or becomes inactive. To
keep track of the product distribution, we associate a
variable Si to each node i. If Si = 0, node i is inactive; if
Si = 1, node i has adopted product A; and if Si = 2, node
i has adopted product B. We summarize our model and
the decision process in Fig. 1 and its caption. We have
made a Python script to simulate our model available at
https://sid.erda.dk/share_redirect/hZOCeo4qU5.
At t = 0, we activate a single node with product A, and
we introduce product B when the first hipster chooses to
adopt a product. In principle, it is possible to generalize
our model to consider arbitrarily many products spread-
ing on a network, but we consider only the case of two
products for simplicity.
Although it may seem somewhat artificial that the con-
formists in our model use only local information to decide
which product to adopt, whereas the hipsters use only
global information, it is both convenient and illustrative
to generalize the WTM model by adding one specific fea-
ture because it so well-studied. This is also appropriate
for exploring the competition between local and global
forms of influence. We examine our hipster model on
both synthetic networks and empirical social networks.
Our main goal is to examining whether (and when) a
small fraction pHip of hipster nodes can lead to a major-
ity of a network’s nodes adopting a less-popular product
at the beginning of a spreading process. We find that
the fraction of nodes that adopt the insignificant prod-
uct depends in an interesting way on the delay τ in the
hipsters’ knowledge of the product distribution in the to-
tal population.
III. SIMULATION OF OUR MODEL ON A
FACEBOOK NETWORK
We start by simulating our model on the Northwest-
ern25 network from the Facebook100 data set [70].
This network consists of the friendship relationships on
Facebook at Northwestern University on one day in au-
tumn 2005. The network has 10537 nodes, a mean degree
of 〈k〉 ≈ 92, and a maximum degree of kmax = 2105. We
assign a threshold of φ = 1/33 to each node. In ad-
dition to this threshold, we independently assign each
node a value Hi ∈ {0, 1} with some hipster probability
pHip to be Hi = 1. Therefore, different simulations of
our model with a specified hipster probability do not in
general have the same number of hipster nodes. We ex-
amine our model with two different time delays and two
different values for the fraction of hipsters in the network.
We consider τ = {1, 4} and pHip = {0.04, 0.30}, and we
conduct simulations for the four combinations of these
parameter choices.
For each parameter pair, we choose a single node uni-
formly at random and suppose that it has adopted prod-
uct A at time t = 0. This node acts as a seed for the
spreading process on the network. We introduce another
product, labeled B, when the first hipster node is acti-
vated. Thus, product B will never be adopted by any
node if the network has no hipsters; and product A has a
head start when product B is adopted for the first time.
We stop our simulations after the dynamics reaches a
steady state, in which no further adoptions occur. At
each time step, we track the fraction of the nodes that
have adopted each of the two products. We conduct 200
simulations — each with a seed chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, and determining new hipster nodes for each simu-
lation — and we average the fraction of nodes that have
adopted each product at time step t over these 200 sim-
ulations. We show the results of these simulations in
Fig. 2.
In Fig. 2(a), we plot the fraction of nodes in the
adopted state for each of the products at time t for sim-
ulations in which the hipster fraction is 0.04. For these
parameters, the curves are indistinguishable for the two
values of the delay time τ . A much larger fraction of
nodes adopts product A than product B. In Fig. 2(b), we
show the corresponding curves for simulations in which
the hipster fraction is 0.30. The results for different delay
times τ are now clearly distinguishable. For τ = 1, the
fraction of nodes that have adopted the two products are
approximately equal; for τ = 4, however, the fraction of
nodes that have adopted product B is much larger than
the fraction that have adopted product A.
IV. ANALYSIS
We approximate the temporal spreading of products
on a network using a pair approximation (as in [26, 28,
33, 71]) that relies on the hypothesis that the network is
locally tree-like [72].[73] Let ρ
(φ,k)
λ (t) denote the density
of nodes with threshold φ and degree k that are in the
adopted state, for a product λ ∈ {A,B}, at time step t.
We write the recursion relation
5Hipster
Network
nodes
Conformist
(active neighbors)
Products at time Products at time
(active nodes in network)
FIG. 1. Illustration of our model of a threshold-based social contagion with hipsters. A node is a hipster with probability pHip,
and it is a conformist with probability 1− pHip. If at least a fraction φi of the neighbors of node i are active (as indicated by
the red coloring) at discrete time step t− 1, the node activates and adopts a product at time step t (for t ≥ 1). We then need
to consider which products have been adopted by node i’s neighbors and the relative popularity of different products in the
whole network. If node i is a conformist, it adopts the product that the majority of its active neighbors have adopted at time
t− 1. However, if node i is a hipster, it adopts the product that is less popular among the active nodes in the network at time
step t − τ (where τ ∈ N). For both node types, a tie results in a node choosing one of the two products (blue versus purple)
with equal probability.
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (n+ 1) = ρ
(φ,k)
λ (n) + (1− ρ(φ,k)λ (n))
k∑
k′=1
F (k, k′, φ)
×Bkk′
 m∑
β=1
q¯
(φ,k)
β (n)

(1− pHip) k′∑
k′′> k′2
Bk
′
k′′
(
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (n)∑m
β=1 q¯
(φ,k)
β (n)
)
+ pHip
∏
β 6=λ
Θ
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (n+ 1− τ)−
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
β (n+ 1− τ)
 ,
(1)
where q¯
(φ,k)
β (n) is the probability that a neighbor, chosen
uniformly at random, of an inactive node with threshold
φ and degree k is active and has adopted product β ∈
{1, 2}; the “response function” F (k, k′, φ) = 1 if k′/k ≥ φ
and F (k, k′, φ) = 0 otherwise; Θ(x) is the step function
(so it equals 1 for x > 0 and 0 otherwise); and
Bkl (p) =
(
k
l
)
pl(1− p)k−l (2)
is the binomial function for probability p. We write
q¯
(φ,k)
k (n) as a function of q
(φ′,k′)
i (n), the probability that,
for a given inactive node, a neighbor with degree k′ and
threshold φ′ is active at time step n. This probability is
given by
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (n) =
∑
k′,φ′ P ((k, φ), (k
′, φ′)) qφ
′,k
λ (n)∑
k′,φ′ P ((k, φ), (k
′, φ′))
, (3)
where P ((k, φ), (k′, φ′)) is the probability that a node
with degree k and threshold φ is adjacent to a node with
degree k′ and threshold φ′. Given an active node, the
probability that a particular neighbor with degree k and
threshold φ is active is
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B
A
B
0.8 1.0
(a)
A
B
A
B
(b)
FIG. 2. Example of the behavior of our hipster threshold
model on a Facebook network for delay values τ = {1, 4} for
(a) a hipster fraction of pHip = 0.04 and (b) a hipster fraction
of pHip = 0.30. In each panel, we show the fraction of nodes in
the network that have adopted each of the two products as a
function of time. For a given value of the delay, the curves are
almost indistinguishable from each other. In panel (b), the
adoption fractions of the two products are clearly different
when we use different delays (τ = 1 and τ = 4). For τ = 1,
the final fractions that have adopted product A and B are
approximately equal. However, for τ = 4, product B is ulti-
mately adopted more than product A. For both panels, each
data point is a mean over 200 simulations on the same net-
work (the Northwestern25 network of the Facebook100
data set[70]), where we choose both seed nodes and hipster
nodes uniformly at random for each of the simulations.
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(φ,k)
λ (n+ 1) = ρ
(φ,k)
λ (n) + (1− ρ(φ,k)λ (n))
k−1∑
k′=1
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×Bkk′
 m∑
β=1
q¯
(φ,k)
β (n)

(1− pHip) k′∑
k′′> k′2
Bk
′
k′′
(
q¯
(φ,k)
λ (n)∑m
β=1 q¯
(φ,k)
β (n)
)
+ pHip
∏
β 6=λ
Θ
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
λ (n+ 1− τ)−
∑
k,φ
ρ
(φ,k)
β (n+ 1− τ)
 .
(4)
The only difference between Eq. (4) and Eq. (1) stems
from the following: in Eq. (1), we consider any degree-k
node; however, in Eq. (4), we consider a degree-k neigh-
bor of an inactive node. The latter has a maximum of
k − 1 active neighbors, which is therefore the maximum
value of the index of the first sum in Eq. (4). In these
equations, we have assumed that each neighbor of node
i is independent of the others, so we are assuming that
this process is occurring on a locally tree-like network
[2, 72]. However, the Facebook network that we used in
Section III has a large local clustering coefficient[70], so
it is not locally tree-like.
V. HIPSTER THRESHOLD MODEL ON
SYNTHETIC NETWORKS
We now test our analytical approximations of Section
IV by simulating our model on various synthetic net-
works with N = 10, 000 nodes. We assign each node i
a threshold φi from some probability distribution f(φ),
which we specify in the following subsections. We also
independently assign each node i a value Hi ∈ {0, 1} to
determine if it is a hipster. As before, pHip denotes the
probability of being assigned the hipster value Hi = 1.
As with our simulations on the Facebook network in
Section III, we select a single node uniformly at random
to have adopted product A at time t = 0. This node is
the seed of the spreading process. There is a risk that
the chosen seed node is located in a neighborhood of very
few vulnerable nodes. (A node that can be activated
by a single active neighbor is known as a “vulnerable”
node [9].) With such a seed, few nodes are activated
in that realization of the dynamical process, and we do
not observe a cascade of adoptions in which many nodes
adopt a product.
To focus on situations in which many nodes adopt (ei-
ther of the products), we consider only realizations in
which at least some minimal fraction of nodes eventually
adopt a product. We take this minimal threshold to be
0.10. (Another way to examine situations with a lot of
spreading is through “cluster seeding” [30], in which one
considers initial conditions in which some node and all
of its neighbors start out as adopters.) In Table I, we
indicate the number of discarded realizations, the mean
fraction of adopting nodes in these simulations, and the
standard deviation of this number of adopters for several
types of networks. The threshold 0.10 is much larger than
the mean fraction of adopters in discarded realizations,
and it is much smaller than the fraction of adopting nodes
in realizations that we keep. Thus, this choice of thresh-
old entails a clear separation between realizations with
cascades of adoption and those without such cascades.
In many of our networks, the number of discarded simu-
lations (in which there are few adoptions) is very large,
consistent with the empirical study of Goel et al. [74].
A. 5-regular configuration-model networks
We consider configuration-model networks [75] in
which every node has degree 5. As described in [75, 76],
we match stubs (i.e., ends of edges) uniformly at random.
We suppose that each node has a threshold φi = 0.19
with probability p0 = 0.8 and a threshold of φi = 0.8
with probability 1 − p0 = 0.2. Therefore, on average,
80% of the nodes are vulnerable, and 20% of the nodes
can adopt only when 4 or more of their nearest neigh-
bors are adopters. We choose these parameters because
there are nodes that need different numbers of neighbors
to adopt, and it ensures that a cascade of product adop-
tions occurs in most realizations of our simulations.
We examine our hipster threshold model on the net-
works for time delays τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and hipster
probabilities of pHip ∈ [0, 1] (in increments of 0.01). For
each parameter pair (τ, pHip), we simulate our model on
200 different networks. We independently draw the spe-
cific sets of networks for different parameter values, so
in general they are not the same networks. For each
realization, we stop the simulations after the distribu-
tion of product adoptions reaches a steady state, and we
track the adoption fractions of the two products. From
these values, we calculate the mean fraction of nodes that
adopt each product over the 200 realizations and the cor-
responding standard deviations of the means. We plot
these values in Fig. 3.
For all hipster delay times τ , the steady-state fraction
ρB,tot(t→∞) of nodes that have adopted product B in-
creases rapidly for small pHip. For τ = 1 [see Fig. 3(a)],
the hipsters have access to information without any de-
8lays, and their behavior leads to a balancing of the dis-
tributions of products A and B. If a sufficiently large
fraction of the nodes are hipsters, the mean final fraction
of nodes that have adopted one product is almost indis-
tinguishable from the other. This occurs for pHip ' 0.09.
In all examined cases, ρB,tot(t → ∞) approximately
equals ρA,tot(t → ∞) (i.e., the steady-state fraction of
nodes that have adopted product A) for pHip ≈ 0.09.
For τ ≥ 2 [see Fig. 3(b)–(f)] and pHip ' 0.09, there ex-
ists an interval of pHip values in which ρB,tot(t → ∞) >
ρA,tot(t→∞). This interval is larger for larger values of
τ , and the peak of ρB,tot(t → ∞) in this interval grows
with τ , taking a value above 0.8 for τ = 6 [see Fig. 3(f)].
In other words, the fraction of hipsters must be larger
than about 0.09 for product B to become adopted by
a larger fraction of the population than product A at
steady state.
For τ = 2 [see Fig. 3(b)], we observe another (and
wider) pHip interval (specifically, at about [0.35, 0.69]) in
which product B beats product A. For pHip ' 0.69,
product A dominates. Hence, for τ = 2, product B dom-
inates in two pHip intervals, and product A dominates
in three pHip intervals. However, τ = 3 [see Fig. 3(c)]
results in two intervals of dominance for each product.
Product B is the most popular product at steady state
in hipster-probability intervals starting at pHip ≈ 0.09
and pHip ≈ 0.69. Our simulations with τ ≥ 4 result in a
single pHip interval in which product B is more popular
than product A at steady state. From the standard de-
viations, we see that different realizations with the same
parameter values can yield rather different results.
Our analytical approximation and numerical compu-
tations match well for small and very large pHip. How-
ever, our approximation includes jumps in the fraction
of adopters for each of the products, and we do not ob-
serve such discontinuities in our simulations. The mean
fraction of nodes that adopt a product in the discarded
realizations is 0.0001, which is much less than the thresh-
old of 0.10.
B. 3-regular configuration-model networks
We now examine our hipster threshold model on 3-
regular configuration-model networks. Suppose that a
fraction p0 = 0.8 of the nodes have a threshold of φ = 0.3
and that the remaining fraction 1−p0 = 0.2 of the nodes
have a threshold of φ = 0.65. We perform simulations as
in the 5-regular configuration-model networks (see Sec-
tion V A) and show our results in Fig. 4.
Our results on 3-regular configuration-model networks
differ from those on 5-regular configuration-model net-
works in several ways. One interesting result is that the
fractions that adopt products A and B are very similar
for τ = 2 [see Fig. 4(b)] and pHip ∈ [0.06, 0.93]. Addi-
tionally, for all examined τ ≥ 3 [see Fig. 4(c)–(f)], the
ρB,tot(t→∞) curve on 3-regular networks has one more
maximum than the corresponding curve on the 5-regular
configuration-model networks.
On 3-regular configuration-model networks with τ ≥ 2,
we observe that ρB,tot(t→∞) first becomes larger than
ρA,tot(t→∞) at about pHip ≈ 0.06, which is lower than
the hipster probability that we observed for the analogous
result for 5-regular configuration-model networks. As we
show in Fig. 5, this transition may or may not change
with seed size, depending on the value of the delay τ .
For τ = 2, the transition occurs at the same probability
when we seed more nodes with product A; however, for
the larger delay value τ = 6, the transition moves towards
larger probabilities for progressively larger sets of seed
nodes who have adopted product A. When the sed size
is 1, we observe in Fig. 4 that the height of the first
peak is lower when we simulate our model on 3-regular
configuration-model networks than was the case for 5-
regular configuration-model networks. For large pHip, the
most popular product at steady state is the same for
τ = {3, 4} [see Fig. 4(c,d)] as for the same delay times
on the 5-regular configuration-model networks, while it
is opposite to that on the 5-regular networks for τ =
{5, 6} [see Fig. 4(e,f)]. For many parameter pairs, the
standard deviations of the outcomes are large, indicating
that realizations with identical parameters can yield very
different outcomes.
Our analytical approximation and numerical simula-
tions match well for pHip / 0.05. However, for val-
ues of pHip that are larger than about 0.05, our ana-
lytical approximation again has jumps that we do not
observe in computations. Our analytical approximation
also does not predict the fraction of nodes that adopt
each product for pHip = 1 as well as it did on 5-regular
configuration-model networks. This may be because 3-
regular configuration-model networks have a higher edge
density than the 5-regular configuration-model networks,
so the former depart rather significantly from satisfying
a local-tree hypothesis (on which our analytical approx-
imation relies). The mean fraction of nodes that were
activated in the discarded realizations was 0.0002, which
is much less than the threshold of 0.10.
C. Erdo˝s–Re´nyi networks
We now examine our hipster threshold model on
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi (ER) networks. Specifically, we examine
G(N, p) graphs, in which one specifies the total number
N of nodes, and each pair of nodes is linked indepen-
dently with probability p. We choose the expected mean
degree of the networks to be z = 5 (so the probability
of an edge between any two nodes is p = z/N) to match
the mean degree of the 5-regular configuration-model net-
works that we examined in Section V A.
We assign the same threshold φi = φ
∗ = 0.2 to each
node. With this threshold, all nodes with degree k ≤ 5
are vulnerable. We again consider pHip ∈ [0, 1] (in in-
crements of 0.01) and τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}. For each pa-
rameter pair (τ, pHip), we simulate the dynamics on 200
9different networks, stop the simulations after reaching a
steady state, track the final fractions of nodes that have
adopted each of the products, and calculate the corre-
sponding mean and standard deviation of the mean from
these data. As in prior simulations, we use a different set
of 200 networks for each parameter value. We plot our
results in Fig. 6.
As with our simulations on 5-regular and 3-regular
configuration-model networks, the absence of time de-
lay (i.e., τ = 1) in the information possessed by hipsters
results in ρB,tot(t → ∞) being almost indistinguishable
from ρA,tot(t → ∞) [see Fig. 6(a)]. For all examined
values of τ , we observe that ρB,tot(t → ∞) again in-
creases rapidly for small values of pHip. For pHip ≈ 0.07,
we observe that ρA,tot(t → ∞) and ρB,tot(t → ∞) have
similar steady-state fractions, although one can also ob-
serve rather interesting dynamics. For large values of
pHip, the same product becomes the more-popular one
at steady state as with the 3-regular configuration-model
networks for delay times τ = {4, 5, 6} [see Fig. 6(d)–(f)],
but product A is the more-popular one for τ = 3 [see
Fig. 6(c)]. We generally observe large standard devia-
tions of the outcomes of realizations with given param-
eter values. The mean fraction of nodes that adopt a
product in the discarded realizations is 0.0072. This is
larger than what we observed for 3-regular and 5-regular
configuration-model networks, but it is still much smaller
than the threshold of 0.10.
Our analytical approximation and numerical simula-
tions once again match well for small values of pHip
(specifically, for pHip / 0.07). For larger values of pHip,
our analytical approximation has jumps in the fraction
that adopt each product, which we again do not observe
in the simulations. One possibility, which we suggested in
our discussion of 3-regular configuration-model networks
in Section V B, is whether our analytical approximation
is running into problems because we are considering net-
works that are not locally tree-like (although similar ap-
proximations are known to be effective for many networks
that are not locally tree-like [72]). Additionally, note that
the mean local clustering coefficient for our ER networks
with z = 5 is 0.00058 ± 0.00018, so our networks have
very few 3-cycles. If we ignore which product is adopted
and pretend that the two products are the same, we re-
cover the usual WTM model; the present paper uses an
analytical approximation that is known to work in that
situation [32]. Our own recent work has demonstrated
that this type of analytical approximation is also effec-
tive for a WTM augmented with “synergistic” social in-
fluence from nodes other than nearest neighbors [28], so
the incorporation of different nodes (rather than the lack
of a locally tree-like network structure) appears to be the
likely cause of the breakdown of the approximation, es-
pecially given that the approximation becomes worse as
we increase the hipster probability pHip.
D. The Northwestern25 Facebook network
In Section V B, we showed simulations of our hipster
threshold model model on the Northwestern25 net-
work from the Facebook100 data set for two choices of
the (pHip, τ) parameter pair. We now examine the model
on the Northwestern25 network more systematically
by considering more initial conditions and a wider vari-
ety of parameter values. Suppose that each node has a
threshold of φ∗ = 1/33. In each of our simulations, we use
a single node, chosen uniformly at random, as a seed at
t = 0 and consider τ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and pHip ∈ [0, 1.0]
(in increments of 0.01).
In Fig. 7, we show the mean fraction of nodes that
have adopted products A and B at steady state. For each
choice of parameters, we choose a set of 200 initial con-
ditions, and we calculate means over these simulations.
The most striking difference between these plots com-
pared to those for our model on synthetic networks in pre-
vious sections is that now it takes more hipsters for equal
fractions of nodes to adopt the two products at steady
state. In the Northwestern25 network, the fractions
that have adopted the two products become equal when
roughly one fifth of the nodes are hipsters. We also ob-
serve that the height of the first peak of ρB,tot(t → ∞)
increases with τ , as was also the case in the synthetic
networks that we examined, and the standard deviations
are once again large for most parameter pairs. The mean
fraction of nodes that adopt some product in the dis-
carded realizations is 0.0001, which again is much less
than the threshold of 0.10.
VI. MAJOR IMPACT OF FEW INDIVIDUALS:
APPROXIMATION ON k-REGULAR TREES
In Section V, we observed that even just a few hipster
nodes can cause product B to become the more-popular
product at steady state, but we have not yet explored
how this phenomenon can occur. In this section, we argue
why even just a few anti-establishment nodes can have
a major impact on steady-state adoptions in our model.
From studying this mechanism, we expect some similar
qualitative phenomena to occur in many other models,
including ones with stochastic update rules.
To understand why even a few hipster nodes can dra-
matically increase the number of product-B adopters at
steady state, we first consider a line of N nodes, which
we number from one end to the other with the labels
0, 1, 2, . . . , N −1. Each node is adjacent to its immediate
neighbors, with 2 neighbors each, except for nodes 0 and
N − 1 (which have degree 1). For the sake of the argu-
ment, we assume that all nodes are vulnerable and that
there is no delay in information (so that τ = 1). We also
suppose that node 0 is the only seed, so it has adopted
product A at time t = 0 (see Fig. 8a). If there are no
hipsters in the line, all nodes in this scenario eventually
adopt product A. If, by contrast, a single node i is a
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Network Number of discarded realizations Mean Standard deviation of the mean
5-regular configuration model 36 0.0001 0.0000
3-regular configuration model 1843 0.0002 0.0001
Erdo˝s–Re´nyi (G(N, p)) 52214 0.0072 0.0010
Northwestern25 35171 0.0001 0.0001
TABLE I. Summary statistics of the discarded realizations of our hipster threshold model on each network family (or individual
network, for Northwestern25). The second column gives the total number of discarded realizations. In it, we sum the
instances from all parameter values, because the values of τ and pHip do not influence which fraction of nodes activate in a
given realization. We show the mean fraction of nodes that are activated at steady state for discarded realizations and the
standard deviation of this mean. For all networks, the mean fraction of active nodes is much smaller than the threshold fraction
of 0.10, below which we discard realizations. For each choice of parameter values and network, we keep 200 realizations for our
samples.
hipster, then all nodes j ≥ i eventually adopt product B.
Thus, if each node has the same independent probability
of being a hipster, the expected fraction of product B
adopters at steady state approaches 1/2 as N → ∞. In
this case, the presence of a single hipster node increases
the expected fraction of nodes who adopt product B at
steady state from 0 nodes to half of the nodes. The main
idea is that early adopters can influence later adopters
in a way that depends on the adoption paths that are
available [40]. Moreover, although the expected fraction
of product-B adopters is 1/2, a realization will be equally
likely to result in any number of product-B adopters, be-
cause every node is equally likely to be the hipster. This
may be a reason why we observe large standard devia-
tions in different realizations of our model on the various
types of network. For more complicated network topolo-
gies, although it is no longer true in general that different
steady-state fractions of product-B adopters are equally
probable, the steady-state adoption fraction in a given re-
alization depends heavily on where hipsters are located
in a network.
With this simple example in mind, we now turn to a
more difficult example: A k-regular tree of vulnerable
nodes in which the central node (which we label as node
0) is the only seed (see Fig. 8b). As usual, the seed
has adopted product A. As in the above example on
a line graph, if a certain node is a hipster, it will force
the nodes that follow it on an adoption path to adopt
product B, rather than product A. We can divide the
tree into hierarchical “levels”: the central node is 0, and
it is adjacent to k nodes in level 1. Each node in level
1 is adjacent to k − 1 nodes in level 2, each node in
level 2 is adjacent to k − 1 nodes in level 3, and so on.
Hence, level l ≥ 1 includes nl = k(k − 1)l−1 nodes, and
all nodes except those in the last level (which have degree
1) have degree k. Such a k-regular tree with L levels has
N = 1+
∑L
l=1 k(k−1)l−1 nodes. In the limit of infinitely
many levels, a k-regular tree is a Bethe lattice.
Suppose that there is a single hipster in the network.
By construction, we can view any hipster as the root in a
rooted tree. We can then make the following approxima-
tion. If all nodes have an equal, independent probability
of being a hipster, the probability for there to be a hip-
ster in level l is equal to the fraction of nodes (nl/N)
that are in that level. If a hipster is present in level l, all
nodes in an adoption path of that hipster (i.e., all of its
descendants) eventually adopt product B. Because level
l has nl nodes, a single hipster in level nl causes 1/nl of
the nodes in later levels (l′ ≥ l + 1) to adopt product
B. Therefore, one can approximate the expected steady-
state fraction of product-B adopters as
ρ¯B(nHip = 1) ≈
L∑
λ=1
nλ
N
1
nλ
(
1
N
L∑
l=λ
k(k − 1)l−1
)
=
1
N2
L∑
λ=1
L∑
l=λ
k(k − 1)l−1 . (5)
For a spreading process on a network, one can construct
a dissemination tree, which describes how a contagion
spreads through the network [40]. For a k-regular tree
with only vulnerable nodes, the dissemination tree is the
same k-regular tree, except that all edges are directed
from the center towards the periphery. The above anal-
ysis indicates that the fraction of nodes that a single
hipster can cause to adopt product B is related to the
properties of a dissemination tree. For dissemination
trees with a progressively larger number of mean descen-
dants per node, we expect a progressively larger fraction
of nodes in an associated network to adopt product B
when a single hipster is present in the network. Equa-
tion (5) illustrates that, for a given network, increasing
the number of hierarchical levels in a dissemination tree
tends to result in a number of product-B adopters from
a single hipster.
To obtain a naive estimate of the fraction of product-B
adopters as a function of nHip when nHip  N , we mul-
tiply Eq. (5) by nHip/N , thereby assuming that adding a
second hipster to the network leads to as many product-B
adopters as the original hipster [77]. However, the sec-
ond hipster may be a descendant of the existing hipster,
such that it does not cause any additional product-B
adoptions. To account for this, we develop a recursive
formula that takes this possibility into account.
Imagine adding hipsters to a network one at a time (al-
lowing the possibility of choosing the same node multiple
times when attempting to add hipsters). We seek to ap-
proximate the expected fraction of product-B adopters
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at steady state in a network with nHip hipsters as a func-
tion of the expected fraction of product-B adopters at
steady state in a network with nHip − 1 hipsters. Let
Pdesc denote the probability that the additional hipster
is a descendant of another hipster in the network. Adding
a hipster has two possible outcomes: (1) the hipster is a
descendant of another hipster, such that it does not yield
additional product-B adopters; or (2) the hipster is not
a descendant of another hipster, so on average it yields
another ρ¯B(nHip = 1) fraction of product-B adopters at
steady state. We summarize this reasoning in the formula
ρ¯B(nHip) ≈ ρ¯B(nHip − 1)Pdesc + [ρ¯B(nHip − 1)
+ ρ¯B(nHip = 1)](1− Pdesc) . (6)
In a k-regular tree, all descendants of a hipster are
product-B adopters at steady state, so the probability
that the nth hipster descends from one of the previous
n− 1 hipsters equals the expected fraction of nodes that
are product-B adopters at steady state in a network with
nHip = n−1 hipsters. We thus insert Pdesc = ρ¯B(nHip−1)
into equation (6) to obtain
ρ¯B(nHip) ≈ ρ¯B(nHip − 1) + [1− ρ¯B(nHip − 1)] ρ¯B(nHip = 1) .
(7)
In Fig. 9, we compare the analytical expression in equa-
tion (7) to computations using 3-regular and 5-regular
trees. Our analytical approximation is a good match
for our simulations when nHip/N is small. For larger
nHip/N , (7) overestimates the steady-state fraction of
nodes that have adopted product B. Hipsters need not
always adopt product B; with more hipsters, it becomes
increasingly likely that product B will not always be the
less-popular product.
Our analysis has several interesting consequences. For
example, it yields some understanding of how the delay τ
affects the steady-state adoption fractions each product.
To illuminate the impact of τ , it is helpful to consider
the following situation. Suppose that, because of hip-
sters, product B becomes more popular than product A
at some point during a simulation of our model. A delay
of τ ≥ 2 postpones the time at which any hipsters start
adopting product A, so we expect hipsters who adopt
product A to have fewer descendants than if τ = 1. This
provides some argument as to why the height of the peak
of the fraction of product-B adopters as a function of pHip
increases with the delay, and it sheds some light on the
effects of the delay. If there is no delay (i.e., τ = 1) and
there are many hipsters, then hipsters tend to balance
the popularities of the two products, leading to roughly
equal fractions of the two products at steady state (as we
saw in our simulations on all networks in Section V).
Our analysis also improves our understanding of how
various changes to our hipster model can affect steady-
state results. For example, suppose that we use a stochas-
tic updating rule instead of a deterministic one. Al-
though the above analysis does not rely on the determin-
istic nature of our updating rule, it does indicate that
adoption order is important, and anything that changes
the adoption order (such as using a stochastic update
rule or updating node states asynchronously instead of
synchronously) may change the outcome of simulations
[78]. However, from our analysis, we do expect some
features of our results to be robust even with differ-
ent update rules and update orders. For example, for
either stochastic update rules or asynchronous updat-
ing, we expect an increase in the number of steady-state
product-B adopters with increasing pHip for small values
of pHip, followed by a decrease (or stall) in the number of
steady-state product-B adopters when enough hipsters
are present in the network (as some of them will now
adopt productA). However, the rate at which the steady-
state fraction of product-B adopters increases with pHip
for small pHip is likely to be influenced by stochastic
update rules and asynchronous updating. For instance,
suppose that we use the same rules for product selection
but that we employ an asynchronous updating process in
which, during each time step, we select a node uniformly
at random to update, we repeat this selection process
some number of times during the same time step, and we
then advance time by one step. We then continue with
this process in our simulations until no further spreading
occurs. In this case, every node in a network can poten-
tially adopt a product even in the first time step, and
the process tends to spread at a different rate — it can
be either faster or slower — than in synchronous updat-
ing. Because the hipsters are distributed uniformly at
random and the rules governing product choice are the
same as in our original model, changing the number of
adopters during each time step can directly affect hip-
sters, as their product choice is time-dependent. (Other
nodes are affected indirectly, as they can experience a
different product selection in their neighborhoods.) Con-
sequently, a faster initial spreading would increase early
product-B adoption for a delay τ ≥ 2, as all hipsters are
guaranteed to choose product B for time steps t ≤ τ .
To test this, we simulate the spreading of products on
5-regular configuration-model networks with τ = 2, with
a single product-A adopter as a seed. Averaging our
results over 100 realizations (which we determine as in
Fig. 3b), we find that the steady-state product-B adop-
tion fraction increases faster as we increase pHip for small
values of pHip than what was the case for synchronous up-
dating (see Fig. 3b). As we expected, we also find that
the product-B steady-state adoption fraction decreases
as we increase pHip for larger values of pHip. More gener-
ally, different update mechanisms and update orders can
yield different dissemination trees, which describe how a
contagion spreads through a network [40]. This can, in
turn, impact steady-state product popularities.
Another aspect that tends to alter a dissemination tree
is changes in the threshold distribution of nodes in a
network. For example, with a threshold distribution in
which all nodes are vulnerable, a spreading process can
reach a steady state very quickly, and there are then few
hierarchical levels in the associated dissemination tree.
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By contrast, a threshold distribution for which a net-
work starts with fewer vulnerable nodes may take longer
to reach a steady state, and one thus expects more levels
in an associated dissemination tree. From our analysis,
we see that this in turn can increase adoptions of prod-
uct B for small values of pHip. Performing simulations
on 5-regular configuration model networks with τ = 2
(as in Fig. 3b) with p0 = 1.00, p0 = 0.90, p0 = 0.80,
and 150 seed nodes supports this intuition. When we
examine small values of pHip, the steady-state fraction
of product-B adopters increases slightly more slowly for
larger values of p0 as we increase pHip.
For some network families, we expect that networks
with different numbers of nodes will have different frac-
tions of product-B adopters at steady state. To illustrate
this point, we consider line graphs and k-regular trees.
For a line graph with a single hipster and a seed node
that adopts product A at one end, the expected steady-
state fraction of product-B adopters is roughly 1/2 for
a line with any number of nodes. However, adding an-
other level to a k-regular tree with a single seed node that
adopts product A affects the expected steady-state frac-
tion of product-B adopters. For example, a 3-regular
tree with 3 levels (and hence with 10 nodes in total)
has an expected steady-state fraction ρ¯B = 15/100 of
product-B adopters, whereas a 3-regular tree with 4 lev-
els (and hence with 22 nodes in total) has ρ¯B = 1/10.
This difference occurs because adding another level to
the 3-regular tree increases the fraction of nodes that are
leaves. Therefore, the randomly distributed hipsters have
fewer descendants on average in the dissemination tree,
decreasing the expected fraction of product-B adopters
at steady state. Using configuration-model and ER net-
works, we have simulated some examples with 103 and
4×104 nodes, and we observe the same qualitative results
as what we present previously. More generally, however,
our analysis demonstrates that the number of nodes in
a network can affect steady-state product distributions.
Even taking seed-size scaling into consideration (see [71]),
dissemination trees can still change, potentially affecting
qualitative steady-state results.
Changing the way that nodes choose which product
to adopt can also drastically influence simulation out-
comes. For example, consider a modification of our model
in which a hipster that becomes active at time step t
adopts the product that is less popular among its neigh-
bors at time t− τ . Further, suppose that two competing
products are spreading in a k-regular tree, in which the
central node is the only seed. As usual, the seed has
adopted product A. When we constructed our approxi-
mation (7) for the steady-state distribution of products
in the limit of few hipsters, we assumed that every hip-
ster adopts product B. In the modified hipster model,
this approximation may be very bad. Hipsters who de-
scend from other hipsters may adopt product A. We thus
expect the product-B steady-state adoption fraction to
increase more slowly with pHip for small pHip if a hip-
ster adopts the product that is less popular among its
neighbors, rather than the less-popular product among
all active nodes in the network. Performing simulations
of the modified model on 5-regular configuration model
networks with p0 = 0.80, τ = 1, and a single seed node
(as in Fig. 3a), we find that a smaller (or equal, for
pHip = 0) steady-state fraction of nodes adopts prod-
uct B for pHip ≤ 0.15, compared to our observations for
our focal hipster model.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
It is important to study what makes information, opin-
ions, diseases, memes, products, misinformation, alter-
native facts, and other things that originate in a small
subpopulation spread to a large fraction of nodes in a
network. Such scenarios can arise in the adoption of
products and the spreading of memes; and they can also
occur in anti-establishment behavior, which can signifi-
cantly impact the geopolitical landscape.
We developed a threshold model to examine the impact
of anti-conformists (so-called “hipsters”) on the spread-
ing of two competing products (one of which, labeled
“B”, is not adopted by any node at the beginning of our
simulations). We examined our hipster threshold model
on various types of networks, and we considered differ-
ent fractions of the hipster nodes and different amounts
of time delay in the global information that the hipsters
possess. In the absence of a time delay, we found that
hipsters tend to balance the adoption of the two compet-
ing products. For all other delay values and all types of
networks that we examine, we observed that the fraction
of nodes that adopt product B (i.e., the product that
would not be adopted in the absence of hipsters) grows
rapidly with the fraction of hipsters. Surprisingly, for
all of our networks, we needed only a small fraction of
hipsters for product B to become comparably popular,
or even more popular, than product A at steady state.
In our simulations on a variety of synthetic networks, we
found that it is often sufficient for fewer than 10% of the
nodes to be hipsters for product B to become at least as
widespread as product A (the only product that spreads
at time t = 0). For the Northwestern25 Facebook
network, roughly 20% of the nodes need be hipsters for
product B to be as widespread as product A at steady
state.
Using a line graph and k-regular trees, we illustrated
why the fraction of nodes who adopt product B increases
rapidly for small values of pHip. On these networks, we
obtained good agreement between simulations and an ap-
proximation of the fraction of nodes who adopt product
B at steady state in the limit of few hipsters. From
our analytical approximation in the few-hipster regime,
we observed that product-B adoption fraction increases
with the distance between the seed node and other nodes.
This gives some insight into why there is a much slower
increase in product-B adopters for the spreading process
on the Facebook network than in synthetic networks, as
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the former has a smaller mean geodesic (i.e., shortest)
path length than our synthetic networks. It also sug-
gests that different realizations with identical parameter
values may result in very different steady-state product
adoption fractions, given that we use random processes
to choose hipsters and seed nodes. One consequence of
such sensitivity to initial conditions is large standard de-
viations in the mean steady-state adoption fraction of
each product, which is what we observe in most cases.
The same mechanistic insight suggests that a larger de-
lay τ results in more hipsters adopting product B early in
a simulation, and each of these early adopters influences
the product choice of later adopters. We believe that
postponing the time at which hipsters choose product A
instead of product B is the main reason that a progres-
sively larger delay τ results in a progressively larger peak
of the expected product-B adoption fraction as a function
pHip. Finally, the mechanistic insight from our approx-
imation in the few-hipster limit of also helps illustrate
that the properties — such as threshold distributions,
the number of nodes in a network, and update rules —
of an update rule or network that affect dissemination
trees (which describe how a contagion spreads through
a network) can affect observations at steady state, al-
though some qualitative observations should be robust
under such variations.
Our hipster threshold model exhibits a variety of fasci-
nating dynamics on different types of networks. For ex-
ample, when there is a delay in global information (i.e.,
τ ≥ 2) and the hipster probability pHip is large, we ob-
served nontrivial dynamics in the number of intervals of
hipster probabilities for which a given product is more
popular at steady state. The quality of the match be-
tween our pair approximation and numerical simulations
also depends on both network structure and hipster prob-
ability. For example, our approximation was effective for
small values of pHip and it correctly produced a fast in-
crease in product-B adopters with increasing values of
small pHip, it did reasonably well for large values of pHip
for 5-regular configuration-model networks (except for
abrupt jumps that are not present in the simulations),
it had mixed results for 3-regular configuration-model
networks (although it yielded the correct result for the
more-popular product at steady state for pHip ≈ 1 in all
but one instance), and it was not good for Erdo˝s–Re´nyi
networks (where it was incorrect about which product is
more popular at steady state for pHip ≈ 1 in roughly half
of the cases).
If there is a delay (i.e., τ ≥ 2) in the global adoption in-
formation that is available to hipsters, we found that the
steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt a product varies
nonmonotonically with the fraction of hipsters. For some
delay values, this steady-state fraction peaks for multiple,
disparate values of the fraction of hipsters; for other delay
values, however, there is only a single peak. This behav-
ior also depends on the network type on which spreading
occurs. If there is no delay in the global adoption infor-
mation that is available to hipsters (i.e., τ = 1), we found
that the final fraction of nodes that adopt product B first
increases rapidly with pHip and then stabilizes such that
approximately half of the nodes adopt each product.
In summary, in our model, even when only one of
two products is adopted when spreading begins, very
small fractions of anti-establishment nodes can lead to
a competing product being adopted by a majority of
a population. Our simple model and numerical exper-
iments may help shed light on the road to success for
anti-establishment choices in elections and competition
between products, as such success (and qualitative dif-
ferences in final outcomes between competing products,
political candidates, and so on) can arise rather generi-
cally from a small number of anti-establishment individ-
uals and ordinary processes of social influence on normal
individuals. In our model, the hipsters always choose
to adopt the product that is less popular at time step
t− τ . If all hipsters regard product A as the established
choice at all time steps — regardless of the actual distri-
bution of adopted products — the steady-state adoption
fractions of product B become even larger, and the anti-
establishment choice (which is product B, in our exam-
ple) becomes even more successful than what we observed
in our simulations. This more extreme situation may be
relevant in elections in which the conception of who is
part of the establishment may not change during weeks
of campaigning and polls predicting which candidate will
win an election and take office.
In future work, it would be interesting to study our hip-
ster model in more detail, including investigating whether
the fraction of hipsters is connected to any criticality, and
to extend the model in various ways. Extensions of our
model may be helpful for studying the impact of anti-
establishment hubs, such as alt-right broadcasting ser-
vices or alt-right Twitter accounts with many followers.
Understanding what makes a large voter population vul-
nerable to the views of a few “hipster” nodes may help
guard populations from manipulation and fake informa-
tion during elections and other scenarios.
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FIG. 3. Distribution of products at steady state for 10, 000-node 5-regular configuration-model networks. The different panels
give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value
of τ , we consider hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (pHip, τ) parameter pair, we simulate the
hipster threshold model on 200 different networks that we construct using a configuration model (in which we connect stubs
uniformly at random). The nodes have a threshold of φ = 0.19 with probability p0 = 0.8 and threshold of φ = 0.8 with
probability 1− p0 = 0.2. For each simulation, we activate a single node, chosen uniformly at random, with product A at time
t = 0. We stop simulations when products are no longer spreading on the network. We plot the mean fraction of nodes that
adopt products A and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. (For each (τ, pHip)
parameter pair, we independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition for each
network.) For all values of τ , the fraction of nodes that have adopted product B at steady state increases rapidly with pHip for
small pHip, reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.09. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product
distribution in the network without any delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost
indistinguishable for pHip ' 0.09. For larger values of τ , which we show in panels (b)–(f), the steady-state fractions of nodes
that adopt each product varies for pHip ' 0.09. The steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B is larger than that for
product A for an interval of pHip values whose left end is at about pHip ≈ 0.09. For τ ∈ {2, 3} [see panels (b) and (c)], we also
observe that more nodes adopt product B for large values of pHip. The height of the peak in the fraction of product-B adopters
above pHip ≈ 0.09 increases with τ , reaching a value above 0.80 for τ = 6 [see panel (f)]. We also plot the analytically-estimated
product-adoption fractions from Eq. (1). Our analytical approximation matches the behavior well for small values of pHip and
large values of pHip. Between these extremes, however, our approximation has jumps in the steady-state adoption fractions of
products; these discontinuities do not arise in our numerical computations.
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FIG. 4. Distribution of products at steady state for 10, 000-node 3-regular configuration-model networks. The different panels
give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes. For each value of τ ,
we consider hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (pHip, τ) parameter pair, we simulate the model on
200 different networks that we constructed using a configuration model (in which we connect stubs uniformly at random). The
nodes have a threshold of φ = 0.3 with probability p0 = 0.8 and threshold of φ = 0.65 with probability 1− p0 = 0.2. For each
simulation, we activate a single node, chosen uniformly at random, with product A at time t = 0. We stop our simulations when
the products are no longer spreading on the network. We plot the mean steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt products
A and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. (For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair,
we independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition for each network.) For
all values of τ , the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching
0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.06. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product distribution in the
network without any delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost indistinguishable
for pHip ' 0.06. For τ = 2, which we show in (b), the fractions of nodes that adopt the two products are similar (though one
can see some interesting dynamics) until pHip ≈ 0.93, above which product B is the more-popular product. For larger values
of τ [see panels (c)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies for pHip ' 0.05. The height of the peak, which
occurs at pHip ≈ 0.08, of the node fraction that adopt product B increases with τ , reaching a value of over 0.6 for τ = 6 [see
panel (f)]. For all time delays τ ≥ 2 [see panels (b)–(f)], the maximum steady-state fraction that adopts product B does not
take place at pHip values near 0.08; instead, it occurs for much larger values of pHip. We also plot our analytically-estimated
fractions of product adoption from Eq. (1). Our approximation matches well with our computations well for small values of
pHip. For pHip ' 0.06, however, our approximation does not do well. Our analytical solution includes jumps in the steady-state
adoption fractions of the products, but these do not arise in our numerical simulations.
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FIG. 5. Distribution of products at steady state for 10, 000-
node 3-regular configuration-model networks with different
seed sizes, where all seed nodes adopt product A. We show
the distribution of products for delays of (a) τ = 2 and (b)
τ = 6. With τ = 2, the adoption fraction is indistinguishable
for the different seed sizes. For τ = 6, our results vary for
different seed sizes, but the qualitative behavior is consistent
across all cases: the steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt
product B increases rapidly with pHip, and equal fractions
adopt products A and B at a value of pHip that increases
slowly with seed size. For seed sets with 10 to 25 nodes, equal
fractions of nodes adopt the two products at pHip ≈ 0.07; for
a seed set 150 nodes, equal fractions adopt the two products
at pHip ≈ 0.13.
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FIG. 6. Distribution of products at steady state for 10, 000-node Erdo˝s–Re´nyi networks with an expected mean degree of
z = 5. The different panels give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster
nodes. For each value of τ , we consider hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (τ, pHip) parameter
pair, we simulate the model on 200 different networks and initial conditions. Each node has a threshold of φ = 0.2. For each
simulation, we activate a single node, chosen uniformly at random, with product A at time t = 0. We stop simulations when
products are no longer spreading on the network. We plot the mean steady-state fraction of nodes that adopt products A
and B in the 200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. (For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we
independently construct 200 networks, and we also independently determine the initial condition for each network.) For all
values of τ , the fraction of nodes that adopt product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.07.
For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information about the product distribution in the network without any
delay, and the steady-state fractions of nodes that adopt products A and B are almost indistinguishable for pHip ' 0.07. For
larger values of τ [see panels (b)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies for pHip ' 0.07. For all τ ≥ 3 [see
panels (c)–(f)] the fraction of nodes that adopt product B is largest for a small interval of pHip around pHip ≈ 0.10. For τ ≥ 4
[see panels (d)–(f)], we observe an additional, large-pHip interval in which a majority of the nodes adopt product B. We also
plot the analytically-estimated fractions of product adoption from Eq. (1). The analytical curves and numerical simulations
match well for small values of pHip. For larger hipster probabilities, however, our analytical approximation is not accurate.
For τ = 5 [see panel (e)], it predicts incorrectly that product A is the more-popular product at steady state for large values of
pHip. Our analytical results also include jumps in the steady-state adoption fractions of products that are not present in our
numerical simulations.
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FIG. 7. Distribution of products at steady state for the Northwestern25 network from the Facebook100 data set. The
different panels give results of simulations of our hipster threshold model with different delay times τ for the hipster nodes.
For each value of τ , we consider hipster probabilities pHip ∈ [0, 1] in increments of 0.01. For each (τ, pHip) parameter pair, we
simulate the hipster threshold model on the Northwestern25 network with 200 choices for the seed node, chosen uniformly
at random, which adopts product A at t = 0. We use a different set of 200 nodes for different parameter values. Each node
has a threshold of φ = 1/33. We plot the mean fractions of nodes that have adopted products A and B at steady state in the
200 realizations and the corresponding standard deviations of the means. For all values of τ , the fraction of nodes that have
adopted product B increases rapidly with pHip for small pHip, reaching 0.5 at pHip ≈ 0.2 for τ ≥ 3 [see panels (c)–(f)] and
for larger values of pHip for τ ≤ 2 [see panels (a) and (b)]. For τ = 1, which we show in panel (a), hipsters have information
about the product distribution in the network without any delay, and the fraction of nodes that adopt products A and B are
very similar for pHip ' 0.3. For larger values of τ [see panels (b)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt each product varies
nonmonotonically for pHip ' 0.2. For τ ≥ 3 [see panels (c)–(f)], the fraction of nodes that adopt product B is largest for a small
interval of pHip around pHip ≈ 0.3. This is the single peak in the adoption of product B in the mean over these simulations. For
τ = 2 [see panel (b)], product B is the more-popular product for large values of pHip. For τ ≥ 2 [see panels (b)–(f)], product B
is the more-popular product for a pHip interval starting at pHip ≈ 0.20. The length of this interval increases with τ , and both
the hipster probability that produces the peak fraction in this interval and (especially) the value of the peak fraction increase
with τ . For τ = 6 [see panel (f)], the maximum fraction of nodes that adopt product B is about 0.90.
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FIG. 8. (a) A line graph in which the leftmost node is the only
seed. (It adopts product A.) If all nodes are vulnerable and
exactly one node is a hipster, all nodes to the hipster’s right
eventually adopt product B. (b) A 3-regular tree in which
the central node is the only seed. (It adopts product A.) If
the tree has a single hipster, all nodes that are descendants
of the hipster eventually adopt product B.
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FIG. 9. Fraction of nodes in k-regular trees with L levels that
have adopted product B at steady state. We show results for
3-regular trees with 9 levels (and hence with N = 1534 nodes
in total) and for 5-regular trees with 5 levels (and hence with
N = 1706 nodes in total). We plot the recursive approxima-
tion from Eq. (7) and show our simulation results, averaged
over 100 realizations, for the steady-state fraction of nodes
that have adopted product B as a function of the fraction
nHip/N (with nHip ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 150}) of hipsters in the net-
work. As expected, our approximation is good for nHip  N .
